Judicial corruption; the Masters of their own downfall
March 16, 2026
Mr Justice Soole (pictured above) is judge in charge of the civil list, second in command of the King’s Bench Division after the President, Dame Victoria Sharp.
We took on the case of Perseus Ventures Limited, a B.V.I property company operating for more than 20-years, and its battle against Barclays Bank PLC and their LPA Receivers.
What we uncovered is a network of ‘Judges’ who deliberately do not judge, essentially acting as ‘agents’ for magic circle law firms, counsel ‘on the square’ and often unscrupulous corporations of common purpose.
7 judges evaded the preliminary argument as it proved PVL’s claim
We expose how Master Brown, Mr Justice Cotter, Mrs Justice Collins-Rice, Mr Justice Freedman, HHJ Pearce, and Mr Justice Murray, all led by Mr Justice Soole, ensured the points at issue that needed determination at the heart of the case, never were.
Addleshaw Goddard LLP, acting for the Defendants, Barclays Bank PLC and the LPA Receivers, David Foskett and Richard Alford of Copping Joyce appeared to be solely reliant on the judicial failure to address the points at issue, to evade justice. Essentially, the Defendants could not defend, so they relied on judicial foul play to evade justice.
The moral of the story is; ‘Judges judge, defendants defend’ , and that line cannot be crossed.
Gross human rights violations through misuse of civil restraint orders
This report deals with an important point law on civil restraint orders and ‘Totally Without Merit’ (‘TWM‘) certification by judges of the Court of Appeal and inferior courts.
The rules on civil restraint orders are being bent and abused. The legal mechanism designed to manage vexatious litigants is being exploited for improper purpose with unwarranted restriction of genuine litigant’s access to justice.
The courts and judges of England & Wales have been grossly abusing one’s right to a fair and unbiased trial, contrary to Article 6(1) Human Rights Act 1998, and in many cases, including this one, one’s right to property, contrary to Article 1 of the First Protocol.
Good claims are being stymied by a sect of lawyers and judges who appear to work as a team, wilfully abusing process to prevent justice being served on favoured parties. This is happening in the Kings Bench Division, as much as it is in the Chancery Division of the High Court and Court of Appeal.
The meaning of ‘TWM‘ is defined by the Court of Appeal as ‘no more or less than bound to fail‘.
Jurisdiction to make a Civil Restraint Order – Practice Direction 3C
The threshold for making a civil restraint order is that two or more applications must be ‘TWM’, and that means, truly ‘TWM’, not ‘purportedly TWM’.
‘TWM’ certifications must be in accordance with the two public policy Court of Appeal judgments on the issue of ‘TWM’ established in Grace & Wasif .
Practice Direction 3C, cannot apply to ‘purported TWM certifications’ . A ‘purported TWM’ is a nullity in the eyes of the law, for it is not a genuine ‘TWM’, but one that transpires, on examination, not to be one at all. (See: ‘Void judicial acts’)
The Court of Appeal’s public policy principles on ‘TWM’
The concept of ‘TWM’ is a significant public policy issue within judicial administration. Certification as ‘TWM’ is aimed at curbing the abuse of court process, serving to reduce abuse of resources and to protect the interests of innocent parties troubled by vexatious litigation, filtering cases that are truly ‘bound to fail’.
At p.19 in Grace, the Master of the Rolls, Lord Dyson, said this:
Although the court always seeks to do justice, the purpose of “totally without merit” is to enable the court to root out claims which are bound to fail, and, for the reasons given by my Lord, I would construe that phrase as meaning “bound to fail”.
At p.15:
First, no judge will certify an application as TWM unless he is confident after careful consideration that the case truly is bound to fail. He or she will no doubt have in mind the seriousness of the issue and the consequences of his decision in the particular case.
The statutory law on restraint orders did not make provision for cheating. Cheating is generally dishonest, but we mean broadly by not playing by the rules, and in this context, we mean whether a Judge dishonestly or erroneously certifies as ‘TWM’ , the result is the same.
In Wasif, [2016] the Court of Appeal set out the correct approach to be taken by judges when considering whether to certify an application as totally without merit. At p.19 the Court established this precedent in respect of all ‘TWM’ certifications:
“But where the application is certified as TWM, so that the claimant has reached the end of the road (subject to appeal), peculiar care must be taken to ensure that all the arguments raised in the grounds are properly addressed.”
We expose how the ‘Judges’ in this case took ‘peculiar care’ to conceal the crucial evidence and argument to prevent justice being served on the defendants, swaying the case in their favour by failing to judge on the issues, then concealing their wrongdoings with lies, falsely representing that the case is ‘no more or less than bound to fail’.
It is obviously contrary to public policy to defeat the ends of justice, and for that reason, the Court of Appeal developed this case law to ensure that all judges play by the rules, so that people’s rights to a fair trial, and genuine claims are not defeated in the way they have done in this case.
Serious judicial misconduct by senior King’s Bench Division judges including Mr Justice Soole
The background – Perseus Ventures Limited v David Foskett, Richard Alford, Barclays Bank UK PLC and Barclays Bank PLC
Pictured left: David Foskett and Richard Alford, the Joint LPA Receivers appointed by Barclays Bank PLC. Right: Legal Director of Addleshaw Goddard LLP, John Duffy, who is alleged to have acted corruptly
In July 2011 PVL renewed a loan facility under a previous 22 December 2006 registered loan charge in favour of Barclays Bank PLC for £600,000.
It came to PVL’s attention in 2016 that 94 Rope Street was effectively ‘hijacked’ by Susan Carol Veale, an undischarged bankrupt at the time who had forged a lease over the Property purporting to be between PVL and her company, White Mid Sloan Ltd.
Barclays Bank PLC introduced PVL to Mr Foskett and Mr Alford, LPA Receivers, who were sold to PVL on the basis that they could use ‘special powers’ to quickly gain a possession order so that the property could be sold. On 14 March 2018, the LPA Receivers, acting jointly, were voluntarily appointed.
After several broken promises both by the Bank and the LPA Receivers to have taken legal action to evict the occupiers, who were paying substantial rent for occupying the Property, which the LPA Receivers also failed to collect, PVL stopped the loan repayments in November 2019.
Recognising the issue, on 15 November 2019, Barclays Bank PLC froze the interest on the loan facility.
On 30 November 2023 PVL commenced proceedings against the Joint LPA Receivers, David Foskett and Richard Alford of Copping Joyce.
Concealment; Repudiatory breach of the LPA Receiver’s 14 March 2018 deed of appointment
The deed of appointment of the LPA Receivers binds them to the contractual duty to have received; ‘(1) The Property known as 94 Rope Street, SE16 7TF’ and ‘(2) All rent and other income derived from such property’. There is no greater or lesser duty to have received the property itself, as there is the income (circa £675,000) that has been derived from it, which they failed to do throughout their appointment, spanning over 6-years.
Even were the claim founded solely on breach of the express contractual obligation to have received ‘all rent and other income derived from the property’, the case is easily proven. A proven case is not, and cannot be, ‘no more or less than bound to fail.
Consequent of the breach, is the quantum of lost income claimed against the Receivers for the income they failed to receive, plus statutory accrued interest and aggravated damages compensation.
On top of the aggravated breach by failure to receive, the LPA Receivers are alleged to have fraudulently breached their duty by failing to have provided ‘effectual receipts’ contrary to their statutory duties to have done so in Section 109(3) of the Law of Property Act 1925.
The Receivers failed to receive, and they failed to have provided ‘effectual receipts’ for the property and income they did receive, to conceal the price they sold it for, and they failed to provide receipts for the income they did receive, to conceal their culpability for failing to have received most of it.
Following our lengthy investigation, this Firm uncovered a further breach in failure by both Barclays Bank PLC who promised to do so and broke their promise, and the LPA Receivers, to have taken possession of the Property, knowing, by their own written admission, that the occupiers were not entitled to occupation of the property under receivership.
On 9 May 2018 the LPA Receivers admitted in their letter exhibited below that they knew Ms Veale and White Mid Sloan Ltd were not entitled to either occupy or to have derived income from PVL’s property, and yet, over 5-years later and still nothing was done:
1___Letter_LPA_Receivers_09-05-2018
Established breach of duty covered up by ‘Judges’ of the King’s Bench Division
On 30 November 2023 PVL filed an interim application seeking a declaration and disclosure of adverse evidence in the interim on these terms:
“For a declaration on the point at issue that D1, as Joint LPA Receivers appointed by D3 were under a fiduciary duty to have collected in rent and all income associated with the Property receivership, and to order specific disclosure of the leases that are, or have been in possession of the Defendants.”
King’s Bench Division ‘Judges’ lied and cheated to evade the declaratory relief and disclosure
PVL applied for declaratory relief pursuant to CPR 25.1.1(b) and or CPR 40.20. For such pre-action relief the courts generally require that there is ‘a high degree of assurance’ [see: Perseus Ventures Limited v Foskett & Ors[2024] EWHC 2120 (KB)], that the applicant is entitled to the declaratory relief sought.
In this case, that ‘high degree of assurance’ was attained by virtue of the deed of appointment terms, binding the contractual and fiduciary duties of the LPA Receivers expressly to receiving ‘rent and all income derived from’ 94 Rope Street. What transpired out of that, was this:
On 15 December 2023, in absence of hearing the parties, Mr Justice Cotter made an order, after Master Brown, who had no jurisdiction, was first allocated to the case on the court file.
Mr Justice Cotter (Sir Barry Paul Cotter (D.O.B: 30 July 1963)
Mr Justice Cotter ‘crippled the interim relief application’, and from the outset, the King’s Bench Division’s approach to the Claimant and its case, was noticeably hostile, as well as contrary to the law.
In his order, Mr Justice Cotter said this:
“An order for specific disclosure can be made in ongoing proceedings; however there are no proceedings. There is no application for pre-action disclosure (see generally the powers of the Court at CPR 31.16); so this application is fundamentally misconceived.”
It was fundamentally misconceived on Mr Justice Cotter’s part. However, PVL’s application is for pre-action disclosure and the law, CPR 31.16 was automatically engaged:
CPR 31.16 – Disclosure before proceedings start
(1) This rule applies where an application is made to the court under any Act for disclosure before proceedings have started.
(2) The application must be supported by evidence.
(3) The court may make an order under this rule only where–
(a) the respondent is likely to be a party to subsequent proceedings;
(b) the applicant is also likely to be a party to those proceedings;
(c) if proceedings had started, the respondent’s duty by way of standard disclosure, set out in rule 31.6, would extend to the documents or classes of documents of which the applicant seeks disclosure; and
(d) disclosure before proceedings have started is desirable in order to –
(i) dispose fairly of the anticipated proceedings;
(ii) assist the dispute to be resolved without proceedings; or
(iii) save costs.
CPR 31.16(1) applies to any pre-action disclosure application. The rule on pre-action disclosure was automatically engaged, yet Cotter J, affronted the law to conceal evidence adverse to the Defendants, the leases that are in the LPA Receiver’s possession, and the accounting information the Defendants are under legal duties to have disclosed.
Disclosure of the leases proves culpability of the breach of duty to have received the rent, and ensured that the claim could be disposed of summarily, saving costs by identifying the quantum.
Together with the declaratory relief that the LPA Receivers were under fiduciary duties to have received ‘all rent and income derived from the Property’, disclosure of the leases proved the quantum of claim.
Abuse by Mrs Justice Collins-Rice failing to judge and wrongful certification as ‘TWM‘
Mrs Justice Rowena Collins Rice DBE CB (Mrs Justice Collins-Rice)
Mrs Justice Collins Rice made a statement which she knew, or ought to have known, was blatantly false, in her 3 May 2024 judgment, p.13 (quote):
“Cotter J was quite right to hold that Mr Walsh had asked for the wrong sort of disclosure. He was quite right to strike that application out.”
It is apparent, the wrongdoing of one, is given credence by the next.
In an affront to the Court of Appeal’s final public policy decisions on the issue of ‘TWM’, Mrs Justice Collins-Rice, the first government lawyer to go direct from the Senior Civil Service to the High Court Bench after 35-years as a government lawyer, certified the case as ‘TWM’.
The excuses given by Collins-Rice for doing so suggests that she knew it was wrong, but did it anyway:
“27. The respondents apply for me to certify those applications as being ‘totally without merit’. Let me be very clear indeed about this. That has nothing whatever to do with the rights and wrongs of any future claim by Perseus. It has nothing whatever to do with what Mr Walsh says the respondents or any of them may or may not have done wrong. It is a label that courts attach to applications which really should never have been brought in the first place.“
28. Today’s applications were brought when (a) Mr Walsh says he is about to issue Perseus’s claim and (b) I have been given no good reason as to why that claim has not been issued a good while before now anyway. The applications did not comply with the rules of court or properly address the tests they set out. Those rules, as I keep emphasising, are there to ensure justice to both sides. In that limited sense the applications before me were without merit.
29. That has no direct consequences for the bringing of a proper claim by Perseus in accordance with the rules of litigation. Any such claim would of course proceed fairly towards an adjudication of its merits in the normal way.”
Contrary to what Collins-Rice J did, the Court of Appeal, at p.15 in Grace, drew the distinction between the case itself and an application within it, saying this:
“no judge will certify an application as TWM unless he is confident after careful consideration that the case truly is bound to fail. He or she will no doubt have in mind the seriousness of the issue and the consequences of his decision in the particular case.”
The ‘TWM’ certification by Mrs Justice Collins-Rice is proven improper and without jurisdiction. Peculiar care appears to have been taken to evade the completed terms of the deed of appointment and the fact that the leases prove the quantum of loss against the Receivers, consequent of that breach.
It appears to be, for that reason, that Collins-Rice J denied the declaratory relief and disclosure, when the overriding objective in this case required them in the interests of justice.
Mr Justice Freedman’s lie and the claim that WAS on foot
On 4 June 2024 PVL’s claim was served on Addleshaw Goddard LLP, acting for the Defendants, the Joint LPA Receivers, David Foskett and Richard Alford, Emma Atkinson and John Duffy of Addleshaw Goddard LLP, and Barclay Bank PLC.
After having evaded the contractually established breach of the 14 March 2018 deed of appointment binding the duty to have received, and after Collins-Rice J wrongfully disposed of PVL’s interim disclosure of the leases, which would have proven the quantum of lost rent consequent of the breach, in PVL’s interim case, Mr Justice Freedman said this a p.83 of his judgment:
“The matters that are before the court are in fact unestablished allegations with unestablished consequences. The court is not at this stage striking out the claim. That is not before the court.
Freedman J must have known that the deed of appointment contractually establishes breach by the LPA Receivers to have received ‘All rent and other income derived from such property.’
A day after we emailed Mr Justice Freedman asking for his comments on our public report called “High Court’s Mr Justice Freedman covered up wrongdoing” , Freedman J resigned from the judiciary and now practices at the same Chambers he left to become a judge.
Freedman J did however, grant Martin Walsh of this Firm and of PVL, rights of audience to represent PVL during the lengthy remote hearings before him. That was a right that was also soon to be taken away…
Master Brown (knowingly conflicted) was installed to act as ‘Agent’ for the Defendants – EMBEZZLEMENT OF PVL’S PROCEEDS OF SALE
Below we exhibit a screenshot of the CE File showing that Master Brown was allocated to the interim case he had no jurisdiction to preside over and that between 30 November 2023 and 15 December 2023 Master Brown had removed PVL’s interim application bundle from the Court file so that any judge looking at the case event log, only saw the Cotter J order, and not the evidence and submissions on which it arose:
HHJ Richard Pearce from Manchester adjourned the case to Master Brown
On 26 September 2024 PVL applied for interim disclosure within the claim proceedings, asking for disclosure of the leases, of ‘effectual receipts’ for the incomes received and for further and better particulars in respect of financial irregularities.
HHJ Richard Pearce – From Manchester Civil Justice Centre
That application came before HHJ Pearce, who we found to be connected with Addleshaw Goddard LLP. We unravel judicial maneuvering designed to have prevented PVL from being heard, whilst ‘Judges’ evaded the written evidence and submissions in tandem.
PVL had applied for a remote 1.5 hour hearing to dispose of its interim disclosure application on 26 September 2024.
Unfair prejudice and perceived bias by HHJ Richard Pearce
On 14 October 2024, one-day prior to the hearing, which PVL had understood to have been remote, as the Freedman J and Collins-Rice J hearings were, HHJ Richard Pearce REFUSED PVL the right to appear remotely.
HHJ Pearce knew, having read Freedman J’s judgment on CE File, that Martin Walsh, resides in Hong Hong. HHJ Pearce must have known that nobody even with the best endeavors, could have got a flight to London to be in Court for the following morning, with a 13-hour minimum flight time.
PVL could not have conceivable instructed solicitors to attend the hearing in the afternoon of 14 October 2024.
The following day, after preventing PVL from attending, HHJ Pearce failed to deal with any part of the application.
Rather, knowing, or ought to having known that Master Brown was both conflicted, and was PRECLUDED BY PRACTICE DIRECTION 2B, Section 2, Rule 3.1(b) from making any order in this case, HHJ PEARCE ADJOURNED THE INTERIM DISCLOSURE APPLICATION TO MASTER BROWN.
The Barclays Bank PLC assisted EMBEZZLEMENT CONSPIRACY
Just a few days prior to the purported hearing before Master Brown, PVL was sent this statement below by email of 27 May 2025 from Ms O’Callaghan, a solicitor at Addleshaw Goddard instructed by Barclays Bank PLC:
It is attested that as of 22 May 2024 the balance to redeem the loan was £456,547.63.
On 5 September 2024, it is a matter of public record that Barclays Bank PLC and its LPA Receivers sold PVL’s property for £841,000.
Therefore, after 5 September 2024, there was no loan to repay.
The statement by Barclays Bank PLC, dated 23 May 2025 falsely represented that PVL’s property, 94 Rope Street, SE16 7TF was sold for just £353,576.73 and due to that, there was a deficit of £102,970.90 said to be owed to the bank.
We quickly established that to have been a lie which we have reason to believe was part of the Defendant’s conspiracy to embezzle the proceeds of sale owed to PVL.
Below we adduce a copy of the Barclays Bank PLC PVL statement showing that on 25 February 2025, Addleshaw Goddard LLP credited PVL’s account with the proceeds of sale:
Barclays-statement-28-02-2025-PVL
On 23 May 2025 there was no loan of £456,547.63 from which to deduct the sum of £353,576.73 from, to give the unique 8-digit sum of £102,970.90.
Since 5 September 2024. Barclays Bank PLC and its solicitors, Addleshaw Goddard LLP have unlawfully prevented PVL from transferring its money out.
On 27 May 2025, Ms O’Callaghan of Addleshaw Goddard said this in her email:
“The full balance was correctly transferred out of that account on 11 March 2025 to credit the loan account owed by PVL to the Bank. This is a normal transaction per the usual course of business.”
Of course, no bank is going to relinquish its security unless the loan is redeemed. What a normal transaction per the usual course of business that is!
Left: Tim Cooper and right: Rebecca O’Callaghan – Partners of Magic Circle law firm, Addleshaw Goddard LLP acting for Barclays Bank PLC and
Below is the official Land Registry record for 94 Rope Street taken on 22 May 2025, proving that on 5 September 2024 Barclays Bank PLC had redeemed the loan and the new owner who paid Addleshaw Goddard LLP the £841,000 consideration for the Property, had also taken out a first charge mortgage:
By close of business on 5 September 2024, there was no loan to pay off, yet, Addleshaw Goddard LLP have admitted transferring PVL’s money out on 11 March 2025.
456,547.63 – 353,576.73 = 102,970.90. However, the biggest problem that Barclays Bank PLC and their lawyers face, is that 841,000 – 456,547.63 = 384,452.37.
Given that LPA Receivers cannot charge fees for fraudulently and or negligently failing in duty, andAddleshaw Goddard LLP cannot charge fees for misadvising their clients, £30,875.74 in unexplained ‘legal fees’ does seem wholly extortionate, against the alleged £300,000 undervalue disposal by them.
As a matter of principle, judges and courts don’t have jurisdiction to conceal obvious serious financial wrongdoing with civil restraint orders.
Uncoincidentally, the lawyers failed to provide any completion statement, and the LPA Receivers failed to provide ‘effectual receipts’.
Extortion by Master Brown, Barclays Bank PLC and the LPA Receivers
On 5 June 2025 PVL’s application adjourned by HHJ Pearce was listed before Master Brown in a ‘Costs and Case Management Hearing.
PVL’s CPR Part 8 claim was for summary disposal. There is no substantive dispute of fact. The completed terms of the deed of appointment binding the duty to receive cannot be diminished, and the quantum arising in consequence of the breach is the income the Receivers failed to receive.
It becomes apparent that the judicial maneuvering was conceived to assist the Defendants.
The intent being to have defeated the claim without touching on the issues.
Master Brown, acting to assist Addleshaw Goddard LLP and its clients, ordered that unless PVL put up at least a further £100,000 of which £50,000 was security for costs, then the claim would be struck out without further order.
Of course Master Brown knew, or he ought to have done, that after having sold PVL’s property for £841,000, the Defendants were holding over £353,000 of PVL’s cash in their accounts.
Why was PVL to have paid over £50,000 to the Defendants when they were already holding PVL’s funds, more than sufficient for the security to cover purported costs?
Why did Master Brown make the unless order?
Why was the claim defeated and struck out when the Defendants were and still are, unlawfully retaining the embezzled proceeds of sale?
PVL’s letter to the President of the King’s Bench Division & failure by Mr Justice Murray to determine the letter or PVL’s application of 26 June 2025 from which it originated
On 26 June 2025 PVL applied to set aside the order by Master Brown of 5 May 2025. That application was in fact, never determined at all. What we find to have happened, is that Master Brown, knowing he had no jurisdiction, sent the application to Mr Justice Murray asking him to dispose of it, showing him the letter, and not the application.
Mr Justice Edward Murray – D.O.B 4 May 1958 sits in the King’s Bench Division High Court in London
On 30 June 2025, PVL applied for directions to the President of the King’s Bench Division after its application of 26 June 2025 was issued. We exhibit the directions application letter below:
Letter_30-06-2025_PVL_Sharp_LJ
On 18 August 2025, Mr Justice Murray evaded the issued application, but certified the letter of 30 June 2025 as ‘TWM’. It was, in our view, an obvious attempt to conceal the substance of the letter.
Contrary to the Court of Appeal’s decisions, it is apparent that Murray J also took ‘peculiar care’ to evade the argument and grounds presented in both the application, and the directions application, describing the directions letter as the application, and making no reference at all to the application itself, before certifying as ‘TWM’.
The pattern of abuse is clear for all to see, and wrongful certification as ‘TWM’ by ‘Judges’ is at the heart of it.
Addleshaw Goddard LLP’s failed application for a civil restraint order and the order by Mr Justice Bennathan
Mr Justice Bennathan
On 21 August 2025 Addleshaw Goddard LLP, solicitors acting for the LPA Receivers and Barclays Bank PLC applied for as civil restraint order against PVL on the basis of the ‘purported’ TWM certifications by Collins-Rice J, Murray J and Master Brown, all of which stemmed from wrongful TWM certifications.
On 5 September 2025, Martin Walsh, for PVL, provided this 8-page witness statement in defence of the Defendant’s application for a Civil Restraint Order:
PVL’s defence was successful but Bennathan J falsely represented that money was owed to the Defendants
In His Lordship’s order of 2 October 2025, Bennathan J negated to account for the argument and grounds set out in its defence statement. Rather, Bennathan J said this:
“4. I refuse the Claimant’s application for costs for resisting the CRO application: while normally costs would be awarded for successfully defeating an application, I decline to do so here given both the outstanding costs orders against the Claimant and his general conduct of these proceedings.“
Bennathan J knew or ought to have known, given the false accounting evidence adduced and referred to by PVL, that since 5 September 2024, the Defendants have unlawfully retained over £353,000 belonging to PVL from the proceeds of sale of its Property, 94 Rope Street. They didn’t account for that!
Mr Justice Soole & the PURPORTED Extended Civil Restraint Order!
On 17 December 2025, the Royal Courts of Justice wasn’t just winding down for Christmas, it was winding up PVL with a void without jurisdiction extended civil restraint order!
Negating to have accounted for the fact LPA Receivers cannot charge for failing to receive, and that the court cannot lend its aid to wrongdoing, or the completed terms of the deed of appointment binding the duty to have received, and the quantum in consequence, it was, it transpired, the intent of the legal cabal acting with Addleshaw Goddard LLP, for Barclays Bank PLC and the LPA Receivers, to conceal their wrongdoings, by defeating the ends of justice.
That’s where Mr Justice Soole came in, with a wholly improper exercise of judicial powers, deploying a civil restraint order, off the back of a series of ‘purported TWMs’ that are not in fact ‘TWM’s within the meaning at all, but rather, void acts without jurisdiction. There’s not varying degrees of nullity.
A look at Mr Justice Soole’s reasoning and rationale
Mr Justice Soole disposed of the PVL application of 26 June 2025 on paper, along with the applications of 8 August and 21 October 2025, saying this:
“There was no appeal against the Order of Master Brown and there has been no application for relief from the sanction which has resulted from the breach of the Unless Orders therein. There is accordingly no basis to make this application.”
No appeal arises from a void order, and PVL’s application was to set aside the order of Master Brown as a Master had no jurisdiction to have made any order in this case according to Practice Direction 2B, Section 2, Rule 3.1(b). The case entails ‘criminal matters’ originating it and later acts alleged to be false accounting currently being investigated by Met Police. Soole J negated to have taken any care to address the incontrovertible point.
An application to set aside an order made by a Master who had no jurisdiction to make it has a reasonable prospect of success. An action to set aside an order said to be founded by fraud (concealment) is a fresh cause of action.
Mr Justice Soole in robed judicial attire – How judicial?
Mr Justice Soole took ‘peculiar care’ to evade the obvious financial irregularities concerning the sale of 94 Rope Street
It is evident that Mr Justice Soole took peculiar care to evade of fraud and false accounting financial irregularities in the evidence relied on by PVL in its applications of and since 26 June 2025.
An affront to the rule that precluded jurisdiction of a Master
It is evident that Soole J invented reasons on his own whim that were are are, contrary to law:
“(2) In any event the Claimant’s application is plainly and obviously unarguable. There is no basis for the contention that the Orders of His Honour Judge Pearce dated 15 October 2024 and of Master Brown are ‘void’ or should be set aside; nor for the various allegations of judicial impropriety which are made in the application and supporting evidence. (3) For these reasons the application is bound to fail and totally without merit.”
It becomes clear to the reader there were no reasons at all. Rather, the obvious basis for the application is that the case directly involves ‘criminal matters‘ and it is not PVL that determines that Master Brown had no jurisdiction, and therefore his order and the order of HHJ Pearce installing him is void without jurisdiction, it is the statutory rule itself:
“PRACTICE DIRECTION 2B – ALLOCATION OF CASES TO LEVELS OF JUDICIARY
1.1. Section II of this Practice Direction sets out the matters over which Masters or District Judges do not have jurisdiction or which they may deal with only on certain conditions. References to Circuit Judges include Recorders and references to Masters and District Judges include Deputies.
Section II – The High Court:
3.1 A Master or District Judge may not make orders or grant interim remedies- (a) relating to the liberty of the subject;
(b) relating to criminal proceedings or matters except procedural applications in appeals to the High Court (including appeals by case stated) under any enactment”
It was, in our view, a serious and aggravated affront to justice for Mr Justice Soole to certify the law as ‘TWM’ whilst taking peculiar care to evade it and the obvious crucial contractual facts and evidence at the same time.
Mr Justice Soole ‘reincarnated’ an application by the Defendants for an ECRO that was already determined!
It is evident that on 2 October 2025 Mr Justice Bennathan dismissed the Defendant’s application for a Civil Restraint Order against PVL.
None the less, Soole J reincarnated it, when there was no application, and no genuine ‘TWM’ certification, he did it all, on his own whim, knowingly without jurisdiction.
Soole J said this:
“3. The Defendants’ application for an Extended Civil Restraint Order (ECRO) is granted. An ECRO is made in the terms of the Order attached hereto and dated 17 December 2025. The ECRO expires on 16 December 2027.”
In absence of a successful appeal or application to set aside, judges have no jurisdiction to ‘reincarnate’ applications that have already been dismissed by another judge of the same level.
Courts and judges do not have jurisdiction to conceal criminality, fraud and tortious wrongdoing with civil restraint orders, and, before any judge certifies as ‘TWM’ ‘peculiar care’ must be taken to ensure that all the grounds and argument is properly addressed.
For avoidance of doubt, that includes any breach of fiduciary or contractual duties.
On 6 January 2026 PVL applied to declare void and set aside the Mr Justice Soole automatically void without jurisdiction ECRO and on today’s date, the application is still in limbo.
INVITATION TO COMMENT
What is the purpose of a judge who does not judge, and what would the ordinary man down the pub think?
The ‘Judges’ involved, te Secretary of State of Justice, David Lammy KC MP, the Lady Chief Justice, the Prime Minister’s Anti-Corruption Champion, the Attorney General and Serious Fraud Office have been invited to comment on this report.
All comments will be published in the public interest. You can post or, if you prefer: email us: admin@intelligenceuk.com
