Excess of jurisdiction means he had no power to do it

When we talk about an act by a public body in excess of jurisdiction, we rely on two leading authorities by the Court of Appeal, and the House of Lords. Both of which affirm that an act in excess of jurisdiction by a judge or any public body, results in a nullity.

A proper and honourable Judge, unfortunately one of a dying breed in the United Kingdom, the former Master of the Rolls, Lord Tom Denning in the Court of Appeal finally determined in Sirros v Moore, that judges who act in excess of jurisdiction are also not immune from prosecution.

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The Master of the Rolls – Tom Denning on the doctrine of judicial immunity & jurisdiction

Acts without jurisdiction:

“A judge of the superior court can go outside his jurisdiction just as any other judge can. His jurisdiction is limited by the law, and not by his own whim. Suppose he is trying a case. The jury find the man “Not Guilty”. And the Judge says: “I do not agree with the verdict. I think you are guilty. I sentence you to six months imprisonment. Officer, take him away”. And the officer takes him away. Such a judge would be going outside his jurisdiction. He would be liable, not merely because he was going outside his jurisdiction – but because he would be knowingly acting quite unlawfully. He would not be acting judicially. He would, I should think, be liable in damages. So would the officer for obeying an order which he must have known was unlawful”

Excess of jurisdiction – Anisminic v Foreign Compensation Commission (1969)

Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147 is a UK constitutional law case which established the “collateral fact doctrine”, that any error of law made by a public body will render its decision a nullity.

Reid LJ in the House of Lords put it this way:

 It has sometimes been said that it is only where a tribunal acts without jurisdiction that its decision is a nullity. But in such cases the word “jurisdiction” has been used in a very wide sense, and I have come to the conclusion that it is better not to use the term except in the narrow and original sense of the tribunal being entitled to enter on the inquiry in question. But there are many cases where, although the tribunal had jurisdiction to enter on the inquiry, it has done or failed to do something in the course of the inquiry which is of such a nature that its decision is a nullity. It may have given its decision in bad faith. It may have made a decision which it had no power to make. It may have failed in the course of the inquiry to comply with the requirements of natural justice. It may in perfect good faith have misconstrued the provisions giving it power to act so that it failed to deal with the question remitted to it and decided some question which was not remitted to it. It may have refused to take into account something which it was required to take into account. Or it may have based its decision on some matter which, under the provisions setting it up, it had no right to take into account. I do not intend this list to be exhaustive. But if it decides a question remitted to it for decision without committing any of these errors it is as much entitled to decide that question wrongly as it is to decide it rightly.

Case study – Judicial decision of 26th March 2018 by ICCJ Jones in Earth Energy Investments LLP v Anthony Hannon, the Official Receiver of London (2018)

The judgment by then Registrar Clive Hugh Jones, now described as “ICCJ Jones”, but still an Insolvency Registrar and not a judge, is the perfect example, and a short analysis in this article demonstrates clearly how the UK’s judges wilfully fail to administer the law to assist fellow unscrupulous insolvency practitioners and lawyers in using the system to hoodwink their adversaries.

Earth Energy Investments LLP , a creditor, wanted to make an application under rule 14.11 of the Insolvency Rules 2016, for the Insolvency & Companies Court to exclude, or to have amended down a proof of debt claim against its subsidiary, where the office holder, Hannon, acting as liquidator, had refused to interfere in the matter.

At paragraph 4 of his 26th March 2018 judgment, Jones himself acknowledged that fact:

Paragraph 1 of the Application is made expressly pursuant to r.14.11 of the Insolvency (England and Wales) Rules 2016 (“Rules”).

The letter before action served on the office holder on 18th August 2018

We exhibit pages 10 and 11 of the letter before action served on Hannon by Earth Energy Investments LLP’s counsel, asking the office holder to make a decision and perform on his statutory duties:

The Insolvency Service Technical Manual for Official Receivers

It is the statutory duty of the insolvency courts, and a continuing legal duty of the insolvency office holder, to administer the mandatory scheme of law in rule 14.25 of the Insolvency Rules 2016 where there are claims arising through direct mutual dealings between a creditor, or one claiming to prove, and the insolvent (company or individual).

The Insolvency Service Technical Manual for Official Receivers, which was current between February 2017 – November 2017 when the Official Receiver (Anthony Hannon) made the decision to fail in his duty to administer the law, put it this way:

Where, before a company goes into liquidation or a bankruptcy order is made, there have been mutual credits, mutual debts or other mutual dealings (see paragraph 40.164) between the insolvent and any creditor of the insolvent proving or claiming to prove for a debt, an account must be taken by the official receiver, as liquidator or trustee, of what is due from each party to the other in respect of the mutual dealings and the sums due from one party to the other must be set-off [note 2] [note 3].

The balance, if any, once the account has been taken, is provable as a debt in the bankruptcy [note 4] [note 5].

By way of summary example, therefore, if a creditor owes an insolvent £1,000 and the insolvent owes that same creditor £1,500, the two amounts will be set-off and the provable debt would be £500, being the difference between £1,500 and £1,000.

In September 2017, Hannon responded to the Earth Energy Investments LLP letter of claim, making the decision to fail in his duty to have administered the mandatory scheme of law, when in fact, the proof of debt claim made, was the 3rd proof of debt made against its subsidiary from the same purported creditor, yet by law, the Insolvency Court has a legal duty to have set off the first claim, which was in the sum of £256,269.89, prior to making the insolvency order.

The third proof of debt claim, which grew from the first, was in the sum exceeding £4.1 million, a claim that is clearly and obviously false, which law intended that both the Court and the office holder set off entirely, with the balance owed to the Company after set off, being mandatorily paid to the liquidator, Hannon, after he collects in the asset for distribution as a dividend to the Company’s creditors.

The rule on double proofs

It was on 1st December 2016 when Hannon, the Official Receiver actins as liquidator accepted the first proof of debt against the Company, but then on 20th December 2016, he accepted a further proof of debt, which he was precluded in law from doing.

Rule 16.73 of the Insolvency Service Technical Manual for Official Receivers, which was then current, set out the process that Hannon was to follow upon receipt of the second proof of debt from the same originating source as the first, from the same purported creditor:

16.73 Double proofs

There cannot be two proofs in respect of the same debt, where this appears to be the case, steps should be taken to verify the creditor’s true position prior to the meeting and the admission of the proofs for voting purposes.

Once again, contrary to his statutory duties, in breach of his fiduciary duty to the Company’s creditors, Hannon made the determination not to act lawfully in “verifying the creditor’s true position, on 20th December 2016, when he had two proofs of debt in his possession in respect of the same debt. The second proof of debt was in the sum of £541,308.89.

It was not until 2nd February 2017 that Hannon accepted the third proof of debt, which gave rise to the letter of claim, in which Hannon determined he was going to go nothing, aside from sustaining a proof of debt that the ordinarily informed lay observer could determine was a bad proof, of which his duty was to have wholly rejected.

Rule 14.11 of the Insolvency Rules 2016 is designed to protect creditors from suffering injustice when an office holder misconducts himself in the way Hannon did by failing in his duty to administer the law, or to have rejected a proof of debt which is clearly and obviously mala-fide.

In 2021 the High Court determined when rule 14.11 is engaged

In Paragon Offshore Plc, Re | [2021] EWHC 2275 (Ch), at paragraph 33, the High Court determined when rule 14.11 of the IR 2016 is engaged:

“Rule 14.11 provides the court with the jurisdiction to exclude a proof or to reduce the amount claimed therein where the court is satisfied it has been improperly admitted by an office holder”

“So, in order for rule 14.11 to be engaged, there must be a proof which has been submitted and upon which a determination has been made”

On 18th August 2017, Earth Energy’s counsel wrote to Hannon, setting out the quantified claim exceeding £9 million in it’s subsidiary, against a creditor claiming to prove for a debt. Hannon was asked to make a decision, to administer the mandatory scheme of law conferred in rule 14.25 of the IR 2016, the law on set off, and to have set off that creditor’s claim, in the sum of circa £4.1 million, entirely, against the £9 million claim.

It was Hannon’s decision to fail to do so, the public body failed to administer law, as law intended that the claim be set off entirely, therefore rule 14.11 was engaged.

On 15th November 2017, after Hannon responded to the letter, making the decision to refuse to interfere in the matter, EEI made its application to Court pursuant to rule 14.11 of the IR 2016.

ICCJ Jones acted outside of the law – Depriving creditors of the statutory right

Acting with genuine bias, on a whim, at paragraph 38 of his 26th March 2018 judgment, ICCJ Jones prevented EEI from exercise of its statutory right on which the application was based, when the law was engaged, by stating this:

“I have already decided that the Application cannot rely upon Rule 14.11″

The application was made on the basis of exercise of the statutory law, and it was in excess of Jones’s jurisdiction to act outside of the law by depriving Earth Energy of its statutory right as a creditor under the rule, when the rule was engaged.

Jones was precluded by law from hearing the application anyway

The application made by Earth Energy was inextricably linked to the same creditor’s application for an ex-parte injunction against EEI to refrain presentation of a statutory demand served on that creditor by EEI.

It was during that hearing that the creditor in question, withheld over 172-pages of witness evidence which proved the EEI demand, and during the same hearing, Ulick Staunton, counsel for that creditor, admitted in the open court on 9th January 2017 that he knew that no claims could be established against Earth Energy’s subsidiary, as contractually, in his own words “force majeure has effect”.

24-days later, Staunton’s instructing solicitor claimed over £4 million, knowing that no such claim could be established, for the reason the Staunton himself admitted in the open court. That was the third proof of debt admitted by Hannon.

The application by Earth Energy of 15th November 2017 was to be the first hearing on notice in respect of the fraudulent non-disclosure during the ex-parte injunction proceeding. It sought to deal with dishonesty and criminal offending in terms of criminal non-disclosure and a blackmail, a further claim which arose against Earth Energy, in the sum of £619,774.48, originating directly as a result of that criminal fraudulent non-disclosure.

It was expressly requested that the application be heard by a High Court Judge, has law intended that the application was to fall exclusively in that jurisdiction.

Jones, an Insolvency Registrar, the same level as a Master / District Judge, was precluded by law from making any order in the case, yet he went on to make orders which law precluded him from doing.

After Earth Energy discovered that Jones was acting in excess of jurisdiction and with genuine bias, by preventing it from enjoying statutory rights of which it was entitled, it made an application to recuse Jones from the case.

At paragraph 26 of his 26th March 2018 order, which law precluded him from making, Jones affronted the law, by stating this:

It is my decision that it was right for me to continue to hear the part-heard Application and is right for me to deliver this judgment. I will do so. The application is totally without merit.

Jones certified the application to recuse him from the case he had no jurisdiction in law to be involved in, as “totally without merit“, effectively certifying statutory law he purports to administer as no more or less than bound to fail. He had no jurisdiction to have done so.

At paragraph 13 of the order that law precluded Jones from making, he stated this:

The second ground on which Mr Millinder relies is that this application should be heard by a High Court Judge. His basis for that is that there was and may still be a case before Mr Justice Arnold concerning the application by the Second Respondent to restrain presentation of a winding-up petition resulting from a statutory demand served upon it by, I assume, the Applicant and/or Mr Millinder. That case is not related to the matters in issue within the Application. The existence of that case on its own cannot support an application for recusal in order that the matter be heard by a High Court Judge.

After Jones circumvented the application he had no jurisdiction to hear, on 30/01/2018 Earth Energy made a further application to deal with everything that Jones concealed, whilst acting in excess of jurisdiction. That came before Mr Justice Nugee, a fellow corrupt High Court Judge of common purpose, on 5th February 2018.

Contrary to Jones’s assertion that the case is not related to the matters in issue, at paragraph 1, Nugee said this:

The third was an application that Mr Registrar Jones be recused or removed from the continued hearing of an application which is in progress, which is an application under rule 14.11 of the Insolvency Rules to set aside certain proofs of debt, and although that application is not before me, it is intimately connected with the matters that are. And Mr Millinder has said that it would be appropriate for the recusal application to be dealt with today, although accepting that the normal practice would be for the recusal application to be heard by the judge who was said to be conflicted.

Contrary to Jones’s false statement at paragraph 13, It was determined by a High Court Judge on 5th February 2018 that the application before Jones was “intimately connected with matters that are (before him). It was ultra vires, beyond Jones’s powers to substantially contradict the finding of senior judiciary. He had no jurisdiction to do it.

At paragraph 14 of his order, Jones said this, once again affronting the statutory law that precluded him from having jurisdiction:

There is nothing before me that justifies this application being heard by a High Court Judge. It is to be recognised that the jurisdiction of the ICC Judges, as indeed, the registrars, as we were previously known, is extremely wide in order to ensure that High Court Judges deal with other matters..

There was an unwarranted demand with menaces (blackmail) a serious criminal offence, in the sum of £619,774.48 originating from a false instrument (perjury) application to Bristol County Court in the sum of £555,000 for a High Court Writ, which originated from the Second Respondent’s ex-parte injunction proceeding and criminal fraudulent non-disclosure during it. At paragraphs 14 and 15, Jones referred to it precisely.

At paragraph 20, acting off his own whim, and non-judicially, Jones invented his own version of rule 14.11 of the Insolvency Rules 2016, which is not written into statute, but applied only to him and this particular case. It was clearly in excess of jurisdiction for Jones to have done so:

As will appear later, the Applicant(s) have not overcome the hurdle of demonstrating that the Company will proceed with the litigation proposed if a new liquidator is appointed even assuming the claim has sufficient merit to make it reasonably arguable.

The statutory law did not require the applicant to prove funding, or to pay the delinquent liquidator who had fraudulently failed in his duty, this is something Jones invented to assist the offenders.

At paragraph 33, Jones sought to cover up a criminal offence which is proven to have been committed by Hannon, contrary to his legal duty to have disclosed the proofs of debt “at any reasonable time” “on any business day”, pursuant to rule 14.6 of the Insolvency Rules 2016. Hannon was evidenced in his statutory reports to Court in the proceeding Jones circumvented as lying and denying all knowledge of the first and second proofs of debt he accepted in December 2016. Jones stated this:

However, he alleges as part of his arguments that the Official Receiver has committed fraud by non-disclosure of the first two proofs. There is absolutely no basis for alleging fraud against the Official Receiver and he should not do so.

It is proven beyond doubt that Hannon committed two counts of fraud by failing to disclose the first and second proofs of debt and the same was later found by Nugee J on 18th June 2019. Jones was perverting and concealing criminal offences, knowing he had no jurisdiction to do it.

The order of 18th June 2019 by Nugee J – A High Court Judge

Paragraph 18:

Two bases for disclosure are set out in Mr Millinder’s witness statement (para 4): (1) He is entitled as a creditor of Empowering Wind MFC Ltd (“EWM”) to inspect proofs of debt pursuant to rule 14.6 of the Insolvency (England and Wales) Rules 2016 (“the Insolvency Rules”). (2) He requires them as part of evidence in a criminal prosecution.

Paragraph 21 of Nugee’s order is where he found that contrary to his legal duty to have disclosed “at any reasonable time, on any business day”, Hannon did fraudulently withhold the two profs of debt:

“I do not myself understand why Mr Millinder considers it so important to see the documents in which these claims were made. He already has the information that Middlesbrough’s original claim was for a total of £256,269.89 made up of claims for rent allegedly payable under a lease (“the Lease”) and energy payments allegedly due under cl 3.4 of an energy supply agreement (“the ESA”): see Jmt [22]. He presumably has a copy of the invoice of 25 June 2015 and letter of the same date in which those claims were put forward. It was this claim that Middlesbrough relied on when claiming to be a supporting creditor in HMRC’s petition in July 2016: see Jmt [29]. (Incidentally the explanation for the discrepancy in the figures identified by Mr Campbell is no doubt because Middlesbrough’s original claim against EWM was not exactly £255,000 but was £256,269.89.) As to the claim to be a creditor in the sum of £541,308, Mr Millinder already has the evidence from Mr Campbell’s e-mail that Middlesbrough claimed to be entitled to a further £285,039 in respect of lost rent and free supply of electricity from 25 June 2015 to the date of the winding up order.
It is not obvious what else he needs”.

Nugee, acting in excess of jurisdiction and with intent to pervert, after finding that the two proofs were the documents on which the claims were made, affronted the law, rule 14.6 of the Insolvency Rules 2016 that provided the legal duty on Hannon to have disclosed, when the evidence filed in the proceeding before Jones, proved beyond doubt that Hannon lied in his statutory reports, denying all knowledge of those two claims which he was under a containing legal duty to have set off entirely pursuant to rule 14.25 of the Insolvency Rules 2016.

Nugee was referring to “rent allegedly payable” and “energy payments allegedly due” because he was acting to conceal the fact that on 5th February 2018, in his judgment, he found that “force majeure has effect” and that neither rent or energy supply was owed prior to the Second Respondent blackmailing Earth Energy’s subsidiary in the sum of £256,269.89, which was the first claim they sought to prove. In other words, it was determined by a High Court Judge on 5th February 2018 that the claims by the Second Respondent were entirely false, and that the claim vested in Earth Energy’s subsidiary was substantially proven, and was therefore due and payable as a dividend pursuant to rule 14.25(5) of the Insolvency Rules 2016.

At paragraph 42 of his 26th March 2018 order, Jones affronted the mandatory law of due process in rule 14.25 of the Insolvency Rules 2016, when it was in excess of jurisdiction for him to have done do. Jones stated this:

Ignoring the existence of the Company’s possible claim in damages for the moment, this means in pragmatic terms that there is no point in time and costs being spent determining the Second Respondent’s proof of debt. Nothing adverse will result from this proof. There is no need for anyone to investigate the proof and Mr Millinder’s contention that the court must do so because it is fraudulent is misconceived. There will be no distribution. The Company will be dissolved without the Second Respondent receiving a payment in any event.

As evident in the scheme of law in rule 14.25 of the Insolvency Rules 2016, law required that the Insolvency & Companies Court set off entirely the first claim by the Second Respondent in the sum of £256,269.89 against the Company claim against it, exceeding £10 million. Rule 14.25(3) and (4) affirmed that, after setting off:

Jones affronted the law and stated there will be no distribution, when law intended that the balance after mandatory insolvency set off “must be paid to the liquidator as part of the assets” and distributed as a dividend to the Company’s body of creditors.

Acting non-judicially, with malicious intent to deprive Earth Energy of statutory rights, Jones breached his oath by acting with favour and ill-will, contrary to the law he is paid by the taxpayer to administer. Law precluded him from doing it.

A perfect and incontrovertible example of an act in excess of jurisdiction, rendering the decision a nullity.

Courtesy of the corrupt government, the Lord Chancellor and Lord Chief Justice who wholly and wilfully fail in their duty to protect the people from delinquent judges who pose a serious risk of harm to those they come into contact with, Jones and many others who have breached their oaths in judicial office, remain there to do it time and time again, same in the knowledge that they are protected by the establishment so they can continue defacing the law and defrauding the people of their rights like Jones has done.

The Promissory Oaths Act 1868

Is long established law designed to ensure that judges only occupy office whist on good behaviour. If a judge breaches his oath, as Jones and Nugee are proven to have done, they are no longer judges, for they have acted in excess of their judicial jurisdiction in abuse of their positions.

“I, Clive High Jones, do swear that I will well and truly serve our Sovereign Lady Queen Elizabeth the second in the office of Insolvency Registrar, and I will do right to all manner of people after the laws and usages of this realm, without fear or favour, affection or illwill. So help me God.”

The long established law is designed to protect the people of England and Wales from the kind of tyranny and judicial fraud inflicted upon the directors of Earth Energy and its subsidiary by corrupt judges who wilfully fail to administer the law or to remain impartial.

No judge has jurisdiction to continue purporting to act as a judge after breaching their oaths in the way both Jones and Nugee have.

The issue however, is once again with the corrupt administration; The Lord Chancellor and Lord Chief Justice, and all responsible for the justice system, who have broken the law and abused their positions of trust against the public interest, by wilfully failing to enforce the one statutory law of great importance, designed to protect the people from abuse of power.

The Promissory Oaths Act is completely unenforced, so this kind of criminal abuse amongst the lawless and unaccountable judiciary, spirals so out of control.

The judges are criminals and human rights abusers, and the ones that keep them there, who are paid by the taxpayer to act in a constitutionally proper way and wilfully do not, are most culpable.

The Lord Chancellor – Alex Chalk KC MP & Lord Chief Justice Ian Duncan Burnett of Maldon

Chalk KC MP took oath of Lord High Chancellor and Justice Secretary to “respect the rule of law” and to “defend the independence of the judiciary“, yet, after months of us approaching him due to his direct involvement whilst he was Solicitor General, acting in concealment of lawless gross human rights abuse founded by political interferences from his party in this case, Chalk continues to wilfully derelict his duty in breach of his oath, and so has the Lord Chief Justice.

All with a responsibility for the justice system have broken the law, statutory law conferred in section 3(1) of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, for coercing and interfering with court process, diminishing the rule of law and defeating the independence of the judiciary.

In Macfoy v United Africa Company limited (1961) 3 All ER 1169, at page 5 of the judgment Tom Denning, then a Lord Justice of Appeal, said:

If an act is void, then it is in law a nullity. It is not only bad, but incurably bad. There is no need for an order of the court to set it aside. It is automatically null and void without more ado, though it is sometimes convenient to have the court declare it to be so. And every proceeding which is founded on it is also bad and incurably bad. You cannot put something on nothing and expect it to stay there. It will collapse”.

There are not “varying degrees of nullity” and everything founded by the nullity, act in excess of jurisdiction is void ab initio (from the outset). It is one’s right, by way of obligation of justice (ex debito justitiae) to have any decision which is in law a nullity, declared so and set aside, a right that a court has no discretion to refuse.

A right that Mr Millinder has oppressively been denied by this cabal of lawless human rights abusers in judicial and ministerial office.
We have invited Lord Chancellor Chalk, the Lord Chief Justice, Clive Hugh Jones and opposition MPs to comment on this article. We will post their responses in the next in this sequel.

We, the people of what was once Great Britain, have the inalienable constitutional right to be governed justly, according to the laws of the land. Under this Tory kleptocracy, the administration and government is lawless and utterly corrupt.

We are at war with the Bar and corrupt liar lawyers in positions of trust of which they are not entitled.

If you, or anyone you know may have been affected by a void act by a public body, get in touch with us today for expert consultancy and reporting designed to deliver results.

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There’s a cure for corruption, and that is, transparency.

Deuda Ltd, a Scottish company was assigned the rights of action in this case by the former directors of Earth Energy and its subsidiary after the corrupt establishment deployed in excess of jurisdiction restraint orders to conceal their abuse and corruption.

Claims have been filed and served on the Lord Chancellor, the Attorney General and Solicitor General, yet the politically controlled Court of first instance is acting as “judge of its own cause” refusing to seal the claims, to prevent the offenders from being exposed and prosecuted.

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